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CASE PRESENTATION
A 57-year-old African American woman with end-
stage renal disease (ESRD) secondary to diabetes mel-
litus was enrolled in a managed care plan. Her primary
care physician told her that he was monitoring her dia-
betes and there was no need for her to see other medical
subspecialists. On presentation to the emergency room
at the UCLA Medical Center, she reported that she used
pork insulin one to two times daily but had not had her
blood sugar checked in the past year. Medication had
been prescribed for her hypertension, but she could not
afford to buy it. She also noted that she was blind in her
left eye and was gradually losing vision in her right eye.
A referral to an ophthalmologist was pending.
In the emergency room, she had physical findings con-
sistent with anasarca. The serum creatinine was 8 mg/dL,
blood sugar was 480 mg/dL, and hemoglobin was 9 g/dL.
She was refractory to diuretic therapy, and dialysis was
initiated through a temporary catheter to control exces-
sive fluid and symptoms of uremia. Therapy with subcuta-
neous recombinant human erythropoietin (rHuEpo) was
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started and she was referred to a free-standing hemodial-
ysis center, where she began thrice-weekly hemodialysis.
She was stabilized on hemodialysis with slow removal of
excess fluid and improvement of anemia with rHuEpo.
She complained of pain at the site of injection of the Epo
and was told that this was the most cost-effective way of
administering the drug.
Three months after dialysis was initiated, the
hemoglobin A1c was 9.5%. The patient was instructed
to follow up with her primary care physician for further
evaluation, but she did not do so. Six months after start-
ing dialysis, she complained of pain and numbness in her
right foot and was told to discuss this with her primary
care physician. Because she came to dialysis three times
per week, however, and had to use public transportation,
she was not able to follow up on this problem either. Af-
ter one year on dialysis, she was told that her phosphorus
level was too high, and that she needed to take a new form
of phosphate binder, sevelamer. She was given a prescrip-
tion for the sevelamer, but when she went to pick it up
at the pharmacy, the cost was prohibitive, so she did not
buy it.
The following month, her laboratory studies showed
a phosphorus of 10 mg/dL with a calcium of 9.5 mg/dL,
and she was again encouraged to take the sevelamer. An
ulcer was noted on her right ankle, and several toes on
that foot were cold. Doppler flow studies showed severe
large- and small-vessel disease, and radiographs disclosed
diffuse vascular calcifications. She was admitted to the
hospital for debridement of the ulcer, but shortly after
admission she complained of severe substernal chest pain
when she became hypotensive during an inpatient dial-
ysis session. Dialysis was discontinued and intravenous
saline was administered, but she developed ventricular
fibrillation and could not be resuscitated.
DISCUSSION
DR. ALLEN R. NISSENSON (Professor of Medicine, Di-
rector, Dialysis Program, Department of Medicine, Divi-
sion of Nephrology, David Geffen School of Medicine at
UCLA, Los Angeles, California): In the 30 years since
patient entitlement to care for ESRD was enacted, the
ESRD program has provided life-saving treatment to
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Fig. 1. Trends in Medicare spending over the past decade. Medicare
costs are obtained from claims files, and include all Medicare as pri-
mary payer claims as well as amounts paid by Medicare as secondary
payer. Medicare patient obligations are estimated deductibles and co-
pays, health maintenance organization (HMO) costs are estimated as
the number of HMO months times the Medicare, average adjusted
per capita cost (AAPCC), and organ acquisition costs are estimated
as $25,000 per transplant. The non-Medicare estimate includes all non-
Medicare patients (using the AAPCC primary payer estimate for Medi-
care as secondary payer patients), and estimated patient obligations
(reproduced with permission from [3]).
hundreds of thousands of patients. It has become clear
recently, however, that the program faces significant chal-
lenges in the 21st century, including a growing population
of patients of increasing medical complexity, a rapid rise
in the overall costs of care, and the lack of access to inte-
grated, coordinated care delivery systems [1].
The Medicare entitlement for patients with ESRD
came with the passing of an amendment to the Social
Security Act in 1972 (section 299I of Public Law 92–603,
1972 Amendments to the Social Security Act), and its
enactment in July 1973, establishing ESRD as the only
health condition so covered under Medicare in the ab-
sence of age over 65 or other disability [2]. It was envi-
sioned that this program would be of great social value,
restoring hope and productivity to the small group of
individuals (approximately 7000 at the time) afflicted
with this otherwise fatal condition. By 2001 this pop-
ulation had grown to more than 350,000, is currently
growing at 7% per year, and is projected to double
over the coming decade [3]. In addition, the average age
of ESRD patients has steadily risen, now approaching
60 years, and co-morbid conditions are common, includ-
ing diabetes, hypertension, and cardiovascular disease.
Once thought to be key to improving outcomes and low-
ering costs, home dialysis and kidney transplantation
have been unable to fulfill these hopes, and in-center
hemodialysis has prevailed as the dominant form of
therapy.
In 1991, the first year for which such data are avail-
able, the overall costs of caring for ESRD patients was $8
billion, nearly $6 billion of which was expended by Medi-
care [3]. Despite making Medicare the “secondary payer”
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Fig. 2. Medicare spending on injectable medications over the past
decade (reproduced with permission from [3]).
(that is, only responsible for up to 20% of Medicare-
allowable costs not paid by the primary insurance) for
the first 30 months of ESRD, thus placing a greater bur-
den on private insurance plans (“the primary payer,” that
is, responsible for paying the bulk of the cost of ESRD
care) since 1997, total ESRD costs skyrocketed to nearly
$23 billion in 2001, more than $15 billion of which came
from Medicare (Fig. 1). This near tripling of the Medi-
care ESRD expenditures, which occurred while the over-
all Medicare budget merely doubled, represents 6.4% of
the total Medicare payments, for coverage of less than
1% of the Medicare population. Of great concern is the
absolute increase in expenditures for ESRD patients, rep-
resenting both growth of the patient population and in-
creasing patient complexity, as well as the rate of growth
of direct expenses, with an 11.5% increase from 2000 to
2001. It should be noted that outpatient expenditures are
growing at a much faster rate than inpatient and physician
costs (Fig. 2), primarily because of the increasing use and
cost of injectable medications, including erythropoietic-
stimulating proteins, vitamin D, iron, and carnitine [3].
Many Medicare+Choice organizations (managed care
health plans contracted with Medicare) and private insur-
ers have realized the importance of the effective coordi-
nation of care for persons with chronic conditions [4–6].
Both the quality and cost of care can be improved through
better integration of the delivery system [7]. Specifically,
these organizations have utilized a wide array of tools
ranging from disease management services and patient
and provider education programs to innovative funding
mechanisms and incentives for achieving tighter coor-
dination of care within non-coordinated or fragmented
provider communities [8–10]. Beneficiaries with ESRD,
however, are the only group eligible for benefits under
Medicare Part A (primarily pays for inpatient services)
and B (pays for outpatient dialysis treatments and out-
patient physician services) who are prohibited from en-
rolling in Medicare + Choice organizations, and thus
from access to care-coordination programs. In addition,
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because Medicare does not reimburse for the costs of dis-
ease management services, this approach to care has not
generally been possible for fee-for-service Medicare pa-
tients. Patients with chronic kidney disease (CKD) who
are not yet on dialysis are not eligible for Medicare unless
they are 65 years old or older or disabled.
The issue of the cost of the ESRD program is not a
new one. In the 1991 landmark report from the Insti-
tute of Medicine, nearly one-quarter of the publication
addressed issues related to reimbursement [11]. More re-
cent publications provide analyses of financing the ESRD
program as well [1, 12–16]. As expenditures for the care of
ESRD patients have continued to escalate, and pressures
on the Medicare system overall to constrain costs have
increased, more and more stakeholder groups are focus-
ing on the current payment system for ESRD, including
government regulators, legislators, and renal community
organizations (that is, professional and lay organizations).
The current system is acknowledged to be replete with
shortcomings and idiosyncrasies, and considerable mo-
mentum is building to have it restructured. Some of
the specific factors that are driving this re-evaluation
have been recently summarized by the Renal Physicians
Association and American Society of Nephrology in a
White Paper on this topic, including [17]: “proposals from
the dialysis industry and federal advisory bodies such
as the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (Med-
PAC) to revise the system [18]; continued reductions in
physician payments for inpatient services; recommen-
dations to stratify payments for ESRD services based
on severity of illness and patient co-morbidities [19,
20]; multiple price increases for Epogen; controver-
sies over payment for other injectable drugs and sepa-
rately billable services; the tenuous financial viability of
independent dialysis facilities; the continued growth of
ESRD patient participation in the Medicare + Choice
system [21]; the completion of the ESRD Global Cap-
itation Demonstration Project [22]; pressure from the
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to examine
and possibly reduce dialysis facility Medical Director
compensation; recommendations from the Institute of
Medicine regarding reimbursement changes to improve
the quality of care for chronically ill patients, including
the use of incentives based on quality outcomes [23];
the improving longevity of ESRD patients, resulting in
an aging of the ESRD population that often has mul-
tiple co-morbidities; the growing need for nephrolo-
gists to assume the role of primary care physician for
patients with ESRD and those with CKD not yet on dial-
ysis; and the greater need for nephrologists to identify and
manage medical co-morbidities, including cardiovascular
disease and diabetes [6–8, 24].”
The Medicare program overall is experiencing increas-
ing pressures to control costs and demonstrate value in
the services provided to beneficiaries. It is projected that
the total number of Medicare beneficiaries will nearly
double by 2030, totaling nearly 80 million individuals.
At present a significant number of Medicare patients
have impaired functional status, and this number is ex-
pected to grow. Over one-half of Medicare beneficiaries
report that they have hypertension, and nearly 20% have
diabetes [25]. The United States currently spends over
$1.24 trillion on health care. This amount represents over
12% of the United States gross domestic product, among
the highest health care expenditures in the world [26].
One-fifth of total expenditures come from Medicare,
which is the largest single purchaser of health care ser-
vices. This spending is concentrated on a small number of
beneficiaries, with 19% of individuals accounting for 85%
of expenditures. This group includes patients with multi-
ple chronic conditions and contains the vast majority of
ESRD patients.
Payment
Payment to dialysis facilities. In the early 1970s, Medi-
care approved payments of $150 per dialysis treatment.
Medicare, of course, actually paid only 80% of this
amount, not including payment to the physicians [1, 12].
By the late 1970s, however, because of concerns over the
increasing overall program costs and the declining inter-
est in home dialysis, Congress passed legislation in an
attempt to encourage the use of home dialysis and trans-
plantation, and mandated the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) to develop a “prospective pay-
ment rate” for dialysis services. This approach was finally
implemented in the fall of 1983. One feature of the new
rate was a differential payment ($4 higher on average)
to hospital-based facilities compared to those that were
free-standing. The payment rates varied depending on
local costs and ranged from $121 to $138 per treatment.
Shortly thereafter, in 1986, the payments were reduced by
$2 per treatment and an additional 50 cents was deducted
to help defray the costs of the United States Renal Data
System (USRDS). In constant 1974 dollars, therefore, ac-
tual payment for dialysis treatments had been cut by more
than one-half by this time (Fig. 3). Small adjustments
in the payments were made into the 1990s, but these
have fallen far short of the costs of providing care. Some
have speculated that the inadequacies of the current pay-
ment system adversely affect patient outcomes, but evi-
dence supporting this contention is lacking [11, 27].
MedPAC, the organization that advises Congress on
Medicare payment policies, annually assesses the pay-
ment system for the entire program, including the ESRD
component. Medicare payments and costs for dialysis
services as well as injectable drugs are evaluated. Cost
reports provided by the facilities are used to evaluate
the costs of the dialysis treatment and erythropoietic-
stimulating proteins (ESPs); Medicare claims data are
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Fig. 3. Decline in dialysis composite rate reimbursement in current and
constant dollars from 1974 through 1989 (reproduced with permission
from [11]).
used to evaluate the costs of other injectable drugs.
The most recent such analysis shows a number of im-
portant trends [25]: the ratio of aggregate payments
for dialysis and injectable drugs relative to costs has
steadily declined to 1.04 overall. That is, for all facili-
ties combined, there is a 4% margin provided by current
Medicare payments; aggregate payments to small and
nonprofit facilities do not cover the costs of providing
dialysis services and injectable drugs, with a 1% and 2%
loss, respectively. Payments for the dialysis treatment it-
self compared to costs also have declined significantly
since 1996 and no longer cover the cost of treatment.
Overall, facilities lose 3% on each dialysis treatment,
with small and nonprofit facilities both losing 11% per
treatment. MedPAC has taken the position that even
though the costs of providing basic treatment exceed pay-
ments, facilities are able to compensate for this loss by
profits on injectable drugs as well as cost-shifting from
commercial insurance patients, in whom it is possible to
assess higher charges. Because the payment for dialy-
sis services is not updated annually for inflation, as are
payments throughout the rest of the Medicare system,
MedPAC has recommended a 1.6% increase in the pay-
ment for dialysis services in 2004. Such recommenda-
tions generally are not acted upon by Congress, the only
entity currently empowered to adjust payments to dialy-
sis facilities.
A recent study commissioned by the Renal Leadership
Council, a trade organization representing large-chain
dialysis providers, has added an additional perspective
to the analysis conducted by MedPAC [28]. This study
took issue with the MedPAC analysis in a number of ar-
eas, including the conclusions regarding profitability and
productivity of the industry; the impact of industry con-
solidation; recent increases in labor, capital, drug acqui-
sition, and overhead costs; arcane Medicare rules related
to bad debt; Medical Director fees; and other legitimate,
but not accepted (by Medicare) costs of providing dial-
ysis services. Concern was expressed that quality of care
would suffer if adequate payments were not provided,
and specific recommendations for increasing payments
were made. Previous studies, verified recently, suggest
that patients in for-profit dialysis centers have a slightly
higher mortality rate than do patients dialyzed in non-
profit facilities; this finding suggests that the diversion of
funds to profits, as is necessary in the for-profit environ-
ment, indeed might affect outcomes when profit margins
are minimal [29, 30].
Payment to nephrologists. In 1983 the Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration (HCFA) (now the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services) (CMS) established the
monthly capitated payment (MCP) for ESRD services
that provided a set payment per month per patient [31].
The amount of the payment originally was derived by
multiplying the payment amount for an office visit by a
separate factor, theoretically capturing the scope of ser-
vices provided by the nephrologist during the month.
This system evolved since that time to represent a mix
of evaluation and management (E&M) services, replac-
ing the single office visit used in the initial model, and
with other changes broadly associated with the imple-
mentation and refinement of the resource-based rela-
tive value system used for the overall Medicare physi-
cian fee schedule. What became a more significant is-
sue for nephrology in recent years is the list of services
that are represented by the MCP, as is true for any cap-
itated payment. Similar to the MCP itself, this inventory
of services had substantially evolved in recent years. The
most significant milestone in this process was the publi-
cation in the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule (MFS) for
Calendar Year 1996 of a list of services included in and
excluded from the MCP that was developed by the Re-
nal Physicians Association, reviewed and refined by the
AMA’s Relative Value Update Committee (RUC), and
adopted by then-HCFA. Even though the publication of
the list represented an important step forward with re-
gard to the specificity of nephrologists’ responsibilities
in treating ESRD patients under their care, several is-
sues not addressed either in this passage of the fee sched-
ule or elsewhere had arisen over time and had become
problematic.
First, if nephrologists saw patients during an outpatient
dialysis treatment and provide a service related to a non-
renal condition (for example, diabetes or cardiovascular
disease), separate billing was not permitted. The result
was a significant barrier to the nephrologist taking on the
role of principal care provider, which clinically is most
appropriate.
Second, ESRD patient services generally were not bil-
lable when these were provided in the Emergency De-
partment, 23-hour holding areas, as well as in some skilled
nursing facilities despite the fact that these sites of care
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required substantial additional work on the part of
nephrologists. This problem produced an incentive to
hospitalize patients.
Third, no specific documentation requirements existed
for services provided under the MCP. This led to confu-
sion over what services had been provided and has been
part of the impetus for a recent MCP change in the pay-
ment system for outpatient dialysis services.
Fourth, the MCP did not provide sufficient considera-
tion to the expenses involved with quality improvement
and patient safety activities conducted by nephrologists,
although nephrologists are expected to lead the continu-
ous quality improvement (CQI) process in dialysis facil-
ities and their own practices.
Fifth, efforts at improving rehabilitation of patients are
common, time consuming, and important, but not reim-
bursed.
Finally, discrepancies remained in allowed payments
among local carriers for a variety of physician services,
with varying interpretations of what was included in the
MCP and what was separately billable.
In January 2004, a new payment system was introduced
linking payment to the number of face-to-face visits in the
dialysis facility. The new system is based on a hypothesis
that more such visits will lead to better outcomes. This ap-
proach, however, has been widely criticized throughout
the renal community.
Components of health care costs
When considering payment policy, one must begin
with the basics. The total cost of health care services
is the product of the number of units of service pro-
vided, the unit cost, and the number of patients served,
as well as the overall mix of services and service set-
tings [12]. For example, if the service provided is throm-
bolysis of a vascular access, the site of service (inpa-
tient versus outpatient) would determine the unit cost
and, this multiplier, times the number of thrombolysis
procedures, determines the total cost to the system of
providing the service. Any decrease in unit cost that
accrued by moving vascular access care to the outpa-
tient setting could be offset if the number of procedures
performed increased substantially. Everything else be-
ing equal, however (number of units and number of
patients), a decrease in unit cost would decrease to-
tal costs. Similarly, if patients are kept healthy through
prospective coordination of care, hospitalizations will de-
crease, decreasing overall total costs [8–10, 32]. For the
Medicare ESRD Program, the goals of payment policy
should include: ensuring patient access to the highest
quality care; equitable payment of providers of care for
work performed, and control to the extent possible of the
total costs of the Program.
A number of studies have analyzed the costs of care for
ESRD patients in a variety of settings, from individual
dialysis programs to disease management organizations
to the overall Medicare ESRD population [3, 8–10, 12,
13]. As one might expect, only 25% of ESRD patients
account for nearly 50% of all costs, and inpatient care
accounts for nearly 40% of costs, a significant portion of
which relates to vascular access care (Fig. 4).
According to the work of the Renal Physicians As-
sociation and American Society of Nephrology’s White
Paper on the ESRD payment system, the characteristics
of an ideal ESRD payment system include the following
[17]:
Sufficient payment to cover the costs of delivering appro-
priate and necessary dialysis treatments, including more
frequent treatments. Providing reimbursement that is at
least equivalent to the facility’s expenses incurred in
supplying dialysis will greatly reduce the need for cost
shifting of revenues from ancillary payment sources to
maintain fiscal viability. This would require agreement on
the true costs of delivering dialysis care, including such
costs as bad debts and Medical Director fees, both le-
gitimate and necessary costs incurred in the process of
providing high-quality dialysis care.
Payment levels that reward the delivery of value in
ESRD services (quality/cost) by promoting cost-efficient,
high-quality care. Sufficient funds must be provided to
enable dialysis facilities to deliver the quality of services
necessary, including the ability to accommodate longer
dialysis sessions, more dialysis treatments, and the use
of more effective, biocompatible dialyzers. Recent data
show that providing “adequate” dialysis for all patients
does incur a cost to the dialysis facility; this needs consid-
eration when one designs an equitable payment system
[33–36]. In addition, for this requirement to be realized,
the payment must be updated on a regular basis so that
new technology as well as efficiencies can be considered
in the payment level as well as the changing costs of pro-
viding the range of services included.
The Kidney Epidemiology and Cost Center (KECC)
at the University of Michigan is currently conducting a
study for CMS on the possible implementation of an ex-
panded prospective payment system for dialysis services
[37]. This work was driven by the current dissatisfaction
with the payment system and a requirement to revise this
system mandated by the Benefits Improvement and Pro-
tection Act (BIPA) of 2000. This study will help deter-
mine whether an expanded prospective payment system
can be developed that includes significant new features
compared to the current system, such as payment flexi-
bility depending on modality and frequency of treatment,
and patient characteristics. If developed using true costs
of delivering care, not just current Medicare allowable
costs, this approach might go a long way toward address-
ing the two areas I just described.
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Fig. 4. Distribution of health care resources for chronic hemodialysis patients at a dialysis facility in South Carolina. (reprinted from Ploth DW,
Shepp PH, Counts C, Hutchinson F: Prospective analysis of global costs for maintenance of patients with ESRD. Am J Kidney Dis 42:12–21, 2003,
with permission from the National Kidney Foundation).
Allowance for prompt payment for effective medi-
cal innovations. One of the factors that is constraining
progress in the treatment of ESRD patients is difficulty in
obtaining reimbursement for new interventions and other
medical innovations such as more frequent dialysis treat-
ments. In the absence of interim reimbursement for such
services, dissemination and widespread use of such in-
novations are limited, and patient access to potentially
life-saving or life-extending therapies is restricted until
clinical trials are available, sometimes for several years.
Even when trials are published and accepted, reimburse-
ment policy often lags far behind regulatory approval of
a new drug and device, further delaying application to
patient care.
Annual review and updating of the payment formula.
The composite rate payment is the only payment mecha-
nism in Medicare that does not undergo an annual review
and update. In the absence of such a methodology, the real
dollar erosion of facility payment in the past two decades
has led to closure of independent dialysis facilities in ru-
ral or underserved areas that already might be operating
on thin financial margins. One of the deliverables of the
KECC project is a market basket of items that could be
used to annually update the composite payment for dial-
ysis services.
Recognition of the importance of the role of dialysis fa-
cility Medical Director, and reasonable payment for these
services [38]. All dialysis facilities must have a Medical
Director by statute, and that individual is responsible for
a number of key areas including quality improvement,
patient safety, and overall medical oversight of patient
care. Acknowledgment of the importance and value of
the Medical Director, and appropriate reimbursement for
the services provided, is essential.
Payment that accounts for the rising costs of compli-
ance associated with increasing regulatory, quality, and pa-
tient safety requirements. In recent years there has been
a substantial increase in the required regulatory bur-
den for all Medicare providers, and dialysis facilities are
not exempt from this increase. Consideration of the ex-
penses incurred by dialysis facilities in this area must
be accounted for in any revision of the composite rate
system.
Payment for services not directly related to the dialy-
sis procedure, but provided in the dialysis facility, such
as measurement of vascular access flow. Obtaining reim-
bursement for services of this nature has proved difficult,
even though the potential cost savings of managing an
ESRD patient through such methods could be profound
[39]. Accordingly, reimbursement methodology should
be established for such activities that is fair and updated
on a regular basis.
Reasonable payment that encourages the medically ap-
propriate site of care to be utilized, including payment
at all sites of care where services are provided. Such a
policy would address the concerns of the nephrology
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community regarding the lack of reimbursement for ser-
vices rendered to ESRD patients in transient care units,
23-hour holding areas, or emergency rooms.
Provision of payment for non-renal-related services
when provided in the dialysis center. Because ESRD pa-
tients are generally in dialysis facilities three times each
week to receive treatment, it is appropriate and in the
best interest of the patient that the nephrologist as-
sume the role of principal care physician [40]. Although
these services are specifically excluded from the list of
ESRD services included in the MCP, obtaining reim-
bursement for these services from Medicare carriers, even
when provided in the physician’s office, can be difficult.
Minimization of the amount of paperwork and admin-
istrative requirements necessary to receive reimbursement
for services provided, including clearly articulated require-
ments for documentation of services. Acknowledging the
fiduciary role of Medicare carriers and intermediaries,
these requirements add an unnecessary layer of com-
plexity in the effort to achieve high-quality outcomes for
ESRD patients.
Payment for effort and practice costs associated with
required quality improvement and patient safety services,
if separate from direct patient care. Within the current
system, a variety of appropriate yet not inexpensive ini-
tiatives related to promoting quality improvement and
patient safety have been mandated without offering a cor-
responding consideration of the expenses to the nephrol-
ogist’s practice of providing these services. Although it is
appropriate that nephrologists be expected to lead CQI
processes in dialysis facilities and in their own practices,
assuming responsibility for the full cost of these services
should not be part of that expectation [41].
Coverage that is consistent across geographic bound-
aries for the same services. Consistency in coverage across
state and local jurisdictions would eliminate one of the
more confounding circumstances confronting providers
of nephrology services, namely, that the coverage for,
and administrative requirements associated with, provid-
ing ESRD services can have substantial variability from
one Medicare carrier or intermediary to another. Further,
even in areas where coverage policy is articulated in a rel-
atively clear manner on a national level, interpretations
by local carriers and intermediaries can vary significantly.
A number of options currently are being analyzed to
address present concerns related to the payment system
for ESRD services. These span the spectrum from main-
taining the status quo, with just the introduction of annual
updates of payment rates, to more extensive restructuring
of the payment approach using a single capitated payment
to cover all ESRD services, including physician services
[16, 25, 42–43]. While incremental improvement in the
current system is welcome, it will not be possible to sig-
nificantly affect the overall costs of the program and truly
optimize the payment system without fresh ideas.
The following is my recommended new approach to
payment for ESRD services that addresses the key goals
of the ESRD program—to improve the lives and out-
comes of ESRD patients, and not break the bank. More
than 30 years of experience of care for ESRD patients,
and the voluminous information on the clinical charac-
teristics and care of patients with CKD patients who are
not yet on dialysis makes it possible for us to construct
an entirely new approach to paying for the care of this
vulnerable patient population. Let me offer seven major
aspects of this approach.
First, a new health plan, called KidniCare, would be
created by Medicare for individuals with CKD stages 3,
4, or 5, including those on dialysis. KidniCare would be
the secondary payer for the first 36 months for patients
with employer-based insurance. To be eligible, individuals
would have to have paid into Medicare for 20 quarters
(compared to 40 quarters currently). It is clear that to
improve clinical outcomes and constrain costs for ESRD
patients, care must be optimized during earlier stages of
CKD.
Second, all medical costs for these patients would be
paid by KidniCare, including inpatient and outpatient
care.
Third, additional benefits would include injectable
drugs (intravenous and intraperitoneal), prescription
drugs, and those non-prescription drugs such as phos-
phate binders and multivitamins formulated for renal pa-
tients that are essential for this patient population. For
injectable drugs given during dialysis (for example, ery-
thropoietin, iron, vitamin D), KidniCare would become
the sole purchaser of these drugs for dialysis patients, ne-
gotiating directly with manufacturers to obtain the lowest
possible prices. To control the costs for other prescrip-
tion and non-prescription medications, KidniCare would
develop a formulary using the principle of least-costly
alternative. In addition, transportation to the dialysis
center and to physician visits as needed would be
covered.
Fourth, physicians would be paid on a fee-for-service
basis for CKD patients not on dialysis. For those on
dialysis, physicians would be paid on a fee-for service
basis, through a monthly capitated payment, but in-
centive payments to nephrologists to encourage quality
outcomes would be developed. An expanded monthly
capitated payment for dialysis patients would include in-
patient and outpatient services and would compensate
doctors for primary care provision. In addition, vascular
surgeons would be paid a monthly capitation to cover
the costs of initial access placement and all subsequent
vascular access reparative work. This payment would be
an incentive for placement of autologous arteriovenous
fistulas. Dialysis facilities would be paid on a fee-for-
service basis, but the composite rate would be expanded
to include all services, medications, and laboratory tests
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provided in the dialysis center. Payment would be tai-
lored to the costs associated with the modality of dialysis
used and the true associated costs, thus making modality
selection a medical, not a financial, decision for providers
and patients, quite different from the current system
[44, 45].
Fifth, physician payment and dialysis facility payment
would be updated on a regular basis based on the bundle
of services included, availability of new technology, and
changes in costs of delivering care. In addition, payments
would be adjusted to the extent possible, to account for
differences in patient characteristics.
Sixth, patients would be permitted to join capitated
care delivery systems including managed health plans or
other capitated programs offered by dialysis providers,
disease management organizations, or integrated health
plans. The payment to such programs would be adequate
for full patient access to care. Further, the health care
provider must have an incentive to give the highest qual-
ity care. The package of benefits offered would be at least
equivalent to that offered by KidniCare.
Seventh, patients who receive a kidney transplant
would have an immunosuppressive drug benefit through
KidniCare that would maintain coverage for the life of
the transplant.
By investing prospectively in the care of CKD patients,
providing funds for coordinated care programs, ensur-
ing that patients can afford necessary medications, and
adequately compensating physicians and dialysis facili-
ties, we can constrain the overall costs of care for ESRD
patients while improving their quality of care. If such a
plan is scored by the Congressional Budget Office, the
start-up costs will be considerable. It is essential, how-
ever, that a careful overall financial analysis of plans such
as this be undertaken, taking fully into account the cost
savings that would accrue with the improved outcomes
that would occur when providers, patients, and payers
have an alignment of incentives and all work together to
improve quality of care.
Finally, I should note that the growing worldwide epi-
demic of diabetes and associated kidney disease in the
developed parts of the world, along with improving di-
agnostic and overall medical care capabilities in other
areas, is leading to an international crisis in the financing
of care for patients with ESRD [46–51]. Many countries
are struggling to find a way to offer life-saving therapy
to the greatest number of people at an affordable cost
to society while balancing other critical societal needs.
Creative, humane approaches to paying for ESRD ser-
vices are needed if these desperately ill patients are to
continue to receive the care they require and deserve
[52].
Let us return to the case presented and see whether
KidniCare would have provided a different outcome.
If the proposed KidniCare had been made available,
this patient would have had access to care long be-
fore she developed ESRD. She could have had aggres-
sive therapy to slow the progression of CKD, as well as
treatment of the complications of CKD (anemia), and
co-morbid conditions (diabetes). With excellent blood
pressure and blood sugar control, and the use of
angiotensin-converting-enzyme (ACE) inhibitors or an-
giotensin receptor blockers, might the development
of ESRD have been significantly delayed? Might the
microvascular complications of diabetes have been
avoided? Once ESRD developed, this patient was not
prepared for renal replacement therapy, and she required
hospitalization and acute dialysis access. Under Kidni-
Care, she would have been prepared in advance for re-
nal replacement therapy and perhaps would have chosen
peritoneal dialysis or a kidney transplant. Under Kid-
niCare, the patient’s nephrologist would have been the
principal care physician, managing the diabetes and its
complications, and referring her to subspecialists as med-
ically appropriate. In addition, with the drug benefit un-
der KidniCare, the patient would have been able to af-
ford all necessary medications. With close attention to
co-morbidity management and access to needed medica-
tions, would this patient’s survival have been longer? Her
quality of life enhanced? This case illustrates many of the
dilemmas in caring for ESRD patients in the 21st cen-
tury. This woman’s course demonstrates how the current
approaches to financing and delivering care to this com-
plex patient population are not designed to optimize pa-
tient outcomes. This unfortunate patient was a victim of a
health care system that provides an inadequate safety net
for the chronically ill, too often focuses on acute episodes
of illness rather than maintaining health, and relies on
costly medications to achieve clinical goals, without re-
gard to the ability of patients to pay for such drugs. In
addition, ambiguities regarding who should have coordi-
nated her care worked to her detriment. While the un-
derlying complexity of illness of this patient contributed
significantly to sealing her fate, the promise of the mod-
ern American health care system failed her, and it is
likely to fail more and more ESRD patients unless sig-
nificant changes in the system for organizing and paying
for this life-saving care are implemented. Rather than
taking small, incremental steps to reform the current sys-
tem, bold, innovative approaches should be developed
and evaluated.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
DR. NICOLAOS E. MADIAS (Chairman, Department of
Medicine, Caritas St. Elizabeth’s Medical Center, Boston,
Massachusetts): It’s likely that the KidniCare program
will escalate cost, at least initially. Have you thought
through the net present value of future savings? Unless it
is positive, I don’t think the program will be attractive to
474 Nephrology Forum: Restructing the ESRD payment system in the United States
CMS. Also, would you please put the proposed program
in the context of the demonstration project?
DR. NISSENSON: What you are really asking is whether
one can make a business case for using reimbursement
policy to drive improved care. Leatherman et al [53] re-
cently discussed this issue in detail and recommended
ways of better aligning incentives for outstanding care.
The KidniCare approach follows this train of logic and
offers a new payment paradigm for Medicare. That is,
investments in outpatient care (Part B) that lead to sav-
ings in inpatient care (Part A) will receive the recognition
they deserve. Under the current system, the two portions
of Medicare are separate, so savings in one part cannot
be “credited” to the other to help offset any necessary
increases in expenditure. By combining the two parts,
the net value of any changes in care will be assessed. It
has been clearly shown that the total cost for ESRD pa-
tients can be decreased by 15% to 25% just by improving
care coordination. In some ways this system provides an
incentive to the insurer, Medicare, to encourage the high-
est quality care, which will yield a net cost savings. The
ability to achieve such savings while improving clinical
outcomes will be tested in the new CMS ESRD Disease
Management Demonstration project, in which global
capitation will be provided and care coordination will be
applied.
DR. MADIAS: Would you comment on the differen-
tial mortality rates of patients in for-profit versus not-for-
profit facilities? Also, what differences in the practices
between the two sectors might be responsible for that
discrepancy?
DR. NISSENSON: This has been a contentious issue, and
no solid data inform us as to the cause of the differences
in mortality rates. It is my impression that the use of more
patient-centered care in not-for-profit facilities probably
accounts for the bulk of this finding [54, 55]. The use of
more technicians and fewer nurses, and lesser access to di-
eticians and social workers, are examples of how for-profit
facilities likely are less patient-centered. More work is
needed in this area so that we can more clearly under-
stand whether differences in patient-centeredness and/or
other care processes play a role here.
DR. CHARLES KLEEMAN (Wadsworth VA Medical
Center, Los Angeles, California): Would it be possible in
any of the advanced nations of the world for nephrolo-
gists not to be impeded by financial concerns?
DR. NISSENSON: Currently, severe pressures influence
health care systems worldwide. In the developed parts
of the world, the epidemic of diabetes and the increas-
ing prevalence of hypertension are producing large num-
bers of patients with chronic illness, including CKD. The
countries with more socialized forms of health care deliv-
ery and payment are slowly migrating toward some blend
with fee-for-service. It has been difficult for any country
to find the ideal balance, and experiments with rationing
care, strictly controlling prices, or constraining use of new
technologies all have been tried. The reality is that health
care is expensive, and providing health care to a popula-
tion requires an allocation of resources that could be used
in other ways. How much should be devoted to health
care is something that should be broadly debated within
a country so that the decision-makers clearly understand
the mandate they are given and the constraints under
which they must operate. In addition to almost universal
concerns about health care costs in general, the problem
of late referral to a nephrologist is consistently present
as well, with no solutions being effectively applied, in my
view.
DR. ISIDRO SALUSKY (UCLA Medical Center, Los An-
geles, California): My question relates to the impact of
new drugs, such as novel erythropoietic-stimulating pro-
tein (NESP), new vitamin D analogues, and calcimimet-
ics, on the calculation of the cost-related care of these
patients. Does the potential scientific advantage of a new
drug play a role in reimbursement decisions made by
CMS?
DR. NISSENSON: Medication costs are important
drivers of the overall cost of care for chronic kidney dis-
ease and ESRD patients. The payment system must allow
for the introduction of new, innovative agents, but the
costs of such agents must be carefully controlled or their
use will not be possible. Patients and physicians are going
to have to be increasingly vigilant in this area, determin-
ing whether new agents are really going to improve care
significantly and therefore be worth paying a premium
for. The concept of least costly alternative is a good start
in this direction, but until now this idea has not been well
received by physicians.
DR. HOCK YEOH (Kaiser Permanente Medical Center,
Los Angeles, California): I think with KidniCare, you hit
the nail on the head because one of the things we’ve found
at Kaiser Permanente of Southern California is that the
most significant driver of cost is the lack of pre-dialysis
care. We analyzed our own data and found that for pa-
tients who went through the pre-dialysis program, hos-
pitalization approximated 1.4 days per patient. For those
who didn’t go through the program, the hospitalization
rate was about 10 days, or 7 times longer than for those
who went through the program.
DR. NISSENSON: I entirely agree that identifying
chronic kidney disease patients early and providing edu-
cational and medical interventions that target complica-
tions of CKD and medical co-morbidities is essential to
improving outcomes and controlling costs.
DR. ALAN WILKINSON (UCLA Medical Center, Los
Angeles, California): My question relates to your con-
cept of a KidniCare program. My concern is the gap in
reimbursement that has arisen because of the way the
Medicare Kidney Acquisition Fund is applied. Trans-
plant centers are only reimbursed for uncovered costs
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in proportion to the percentage of Medicare patients
who undergo transplantation at that institution. When
that percentage was around 80%, it was possible to con-
tract with health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and
other payers at rates that were unrealistically low be-
cause Medicare essentially covered many of the costs for
which those payers should have been responsible. Now
that more patients are insured through payers others than
Medicare, and as the time before patients become eligi-
ble for coverage has been lengthened, it is impossible for
transplant centers to adequately cover these costs. Insur-
ers and HMOs are not willing to accept that they ought
to pay their true share of the costs now that the Medicare
percentage is often as low as 20%. This is particularly
true when patients receive living donor or pre-emptive
transplants. Will your KidniCare plan include proper re-
imbursement for these costs and for rewarding providers
who provide the highest quality of care, including access
to transplantation?
DR. NISSENSON: The KidniCare plan will strongly en-
courage the use of renal transplantation of all types as
well as innovative forms of dialysis, particularly more-
frequent and home dialysis. The Institute of Medicine
clearly articulates the potential value of quality incen-
tives being included in payment systems for patients with
chronic illness [54]. In the ESRD program, such incen-
tives must be constructed carefully, as recently pointed
out by the RPA [56]. If potential pitfalls, including the
problems of adverse risk selection (“cherrypicking”), can
be resolved, such an approach might be of great benefit
to patients and providers. The KidniCare program would
include carefully constructed, performance-based incen-
tive payments of this type.
DR. IRA KURTZ (UCLA Medical Center, Los Angeles,
California): Could you please comment further on the
change in CMS regulations that would tie physician re-
imbursement to the frequency of face-to-face interactions
with dialysis patients in the outpatient setting?
DR. NISSENSON: All agree that there have been great
improvements in the intermediate outcomes of dialysis
patients over the past decade, in part because of the
effort and collaboration of nephrologists, dialysis facili-
ties, ESRD networks, and CMS. More can be done, how-
ever. CMS has determined, based on little scientific ev-
idence, that increasing the number of face-to-face visits
by nephrologists will improve the quality of care for dial-
ysis patients. It would seem more useful to work with the
renal community to clearly define those aspects of care
that improve outcomes, and then to focus on these rather
than to disrupt the current reimbursement system on a
hunch. We need to watch very closely now that this new
approach has been put into place to see whether it has
any positive effects and to immediately sound the alarm
if the adverse unintended consequences that many pre-
dict come to pass. There is no question that the policy as
it now stands will likely severely limit access to care for
patients in rural settings, and it will likely have a chill-
ing effect on the use of home dialysis therapies. These
shortcomings need to be remedied at once.
DR. DALILA CORRY (Chief, Renal Division, Olive View
Medical Center, Sylmar, California): You haven’t men-
tioned patients with Medicaid or those without insurance
at all. How will we provide care for these patients?
DR. NISSENSON: We are reaching a crisis in health care
in the United States for all, not just those with ESRD.
More than 40 million people have no health insurance,
and this leads to poor clinical outcomes and drives up
costs for the insured. This is no longer sustainable. Even
the current safety net, Medicaid, is grossly inadequate
and becoming more so as state budget crises continue
throughout the country. In some states, Pennsylvania, for
example, there is no physician reimbursement for the care
of Medicaid patients on dialysis (Weiss J, personal com-
munication). Despite this, the patients receive uncom-
pensated care from nephrologists. This is inappropriate
and must be changed.
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